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Abstract This study examines the reciprocal relationship between violent crime and
residential stability in neighborhoods. We test whether the form of stability matters by
comparing two different measures of stability: a traditional index of residential stability
and a novel approach focusing specifically on the stability of homeowners. We also
examine whether the racial/ethnic composition of the neighborhood in which this stability
occurs affects the instability—violent crime relationship. To test the simultaneous rela-
tionship between residential mobility and crime we estimate a dual multivariate latent
curve model of the change in the violent crime rate and the change in the rate of home sales
while controlling for neighborhood socioeconomic and demographic characteristics using
data from Los Angeles between 1992 and 1997. Results indicate that the initial level of
violent crime increases the trajectory of residential instability in subsequent years, whether
the instability is measured as homeowner turnover specifically, or based on an index of all
residents. However, the effect of instability on violent crime is only apparent when
measuring instability based on an index of general residential turnover and not when
including the presence of owners in this measure, or when measuring it based on home-
owner turnover. We consistently find that stable highly Latino communities exhibit a
protective effect against violence.
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Introduction
The relationship between crime and communities has long been a focal point of crimi-
nological and sociological investigation. From the groundwork laid by the Chicago School
in the 1920s, the ‘neighborhood effects’ literature has examined how neighborhood context
affects the individual-level behavior of residents as well as the macro-level outcomes for
neighborhoods such as crime and violence. In particular, social disorganization theorists
argue that racial/ethnic composition, poverty, and residential instability all influence the
local crime rate by disrupting residential networks that are protective factors against crime.
More recently, scholars have begun focusing on the possibility that crime can also be an
important catalyst for community change. Increases in crime can have negative conse-
quences for neighborhoods, including increasing residential relocation (Morenoff and
Sampson 1997) and decreasing neighborhood satisfaction (Skogan 1990). As residents
relocate to safer communities, crime can also contribute to neighborhood racial transition
and the concentration of poverty (Bursik 1986; South and Crowder 1997a, b).
Knowing that crime is both an outcome of neighborhood structure and an influential
factor of neighborhood social and economic conditions motivates the need for research to
take this simultaneous relationship into account. Few studies have done this (see White
2001 for an exception). The majority of social science investigations are limited in the
degree to which they deal with this reciprocal relationship, even when using longitudinal
models. We need, however, to understand not only how violent crime impacts neighbor-
hoods in general, and residential stability more specifically, but how changes in residential
stability affects crime at the same time.
In addition, it may be important to take into account the racial and ethnic composition of
a neighborhood in which stability or crime occurs. That is, a growing body of literature
suggests that residential stability alone is not the key for reducing crime in neighborhoods,
but that the context in which this stability occurs has important implications. Scholars have
suggested that residential stability in minority neighborhoods may not always have such a
protective effect (Warner and Rountree 1997). Warner and Rountree (1997) concluded that
although social ties were negatively associated with assault rates in white communities,
social ties were not significantly related to crime in neighborhoods dominated by racial/
ethnic minorities. Likewise, whereas crime may cause increased mobility out of a
neighborhood, it is possible that the racial/ethnic context in which such crime occurs may
also affect residential instability. Higher rates of crime in neighborhoods with higher
proportions of minority residents may be perceived as a particularly volatile combination
that portends a downward trajectory for the neighborhood into the immediate future. Such
a perception would likely lead to an increased rate of out-mobility.
In order to more closely examine the complex relationship between violent crime,
residential stability, and racial/ethnic composition, we use a dual latent trajectory model
(LTM) to estimate the impact of violent crime on the rate of homeowner residential
turnover while simultaneously modeling the impact of homeowner residential turnover on
the trajectory of violent crime. We employ two measures of residential instability (or,
stability, as these are two ends of the same continuum): the first mirrors the approach
commonly used in the literature of combining two Census variables (e.g., average length of
residence and the percentage of new households in the last 5 years) into an index; the
second is a more novel measure of turnover that captures the rate of residential home sales.
The logic of this latter measure builds on the insight that homeowners are a particularly
important source of neighborhood stability and cohesion, as we elaborate below. Note that
for both of these measures, we are testing the extent to which crime brings about a
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particular form of residential mobility: that in which a household moves and is replaced by
another. This type of mobility creates the presence of new households in the neighborhood,
or what is generally measured as residential instability in the ecological literature. In
contrast, we do not focus here on mobility in which a household leaves and is not replaced
by another household (for an example of a study focusing on this type of mobility, see
Morenoff and Sampson 1997). We also take into account the racial/ethnic composition of
the neighborhoods in which this instability occurs by testing whether the relationship
between violent crime and residential home sales is moderated by the proportion of
minority residents. Our analysis focuses on the City of Los Angeles between 1992 and
1997.
The Effect of Residential Instability on Crime
Research within the social disorganization framework has suggested that certain structural
conditions of communities increase the vulnerability of those communities to higher crime
rates. Specifically, Shaw and McKay (1942) posited that neighborhood poverty, residential
instability, and racial/ethnic heterogeneity weaken residents’ attachment to the neighbor-
hood and reduce community organization and involvement. These factors restrict social
interaction among residents, which in turn impedes informal social control and order
maintenance, and reduces the willingness to intervene on another’s behalf. More recent
work has also suggested that a greater number of single-parent households in the neigh-
borhood reduce the ability to provide informal social control that would otherwise reduce
delinquency (Roncek and Maier 1991; Rountree and Warner 1999). As the community’s
concern for the collective environment and its capacity to monitor and control behavior
decreases, crime increases.
An extensive body of cross-sectional studies consistently substantiates the role that
community (dis)organization has on crime control. Of particular interest for the present
study is the relationship between neighborhood residential instability and crime. The
systemic model of neighborhood structure argues that residential stability is strongly
related to community attachment (Kasarda and Janowitz 1974; Sampson and Groves 1989;
Bursik and Grasmick 1993) and involvement (Taylor 1996); and that residential stability
leads to the formation of social networks, community cohesion, and informal social
control. Social expectations, common values, and informal sanctions are therefore trans-
mitted though social ties (Bursik and Grasmick 1993) at the same time that residents
develop a cohesive community structure, supervise the neighborhood, and collectively
address community incivilities (Bursik 1986). Neighborhoods with more stability therefore
should have lower crime rates while neighborhoods with a more transitory population—
more neighborhood change—have greater crime and disorder because the higher rates of
residential turnover disrupt social networks. There is some evidence for the association
between neighborhood instability and crime (for example, see Stark 1987; Morenoff and
Sampson 1997).
Although some studies have found a positive relationship between residential instability
and crime rates in cross-sectional studies, it should also be noted that some studies have
failed to find this effect, or even found a negative effect (e.g. Pattillo 1998; Warner and
Pierce 1993; Warner and Rountree 1997). As a consequence, scholars have suggested that
the context in which this stability occurs may be important. Thus, residential stability in an
economically disadvantaged area may simply represent residents’ financial inability to
leave the area, rather than any increased sense of cohesion (Anderson 1990; Warner and
Pierce 1993). Likewise, if racial/ethnic minorities are limited in their housing options due
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to various discriminating processes in the housing market, they may be constrained to a
neighborhood for these reasons rather than community cohesiveness. Indeed, Warner and
Rountree (1997) explored this possibility in their study of Seattle neighborhoods and found
that the racial/ethnic composition of the neighborhood moderated the relationship between
social ties and crime, and that residential stability was positively associated with burglary
in high poverty communities. Nonetheless, we point out that studies have generally failed
to explore this theoretical possibility using longitudinal data.
Furthermore, whereas prior work often only makes a distinction between the extent to
which the composition of the neighborhood is white or non-white, we make a further
distinction between two key minority groups of African-Americans and Latinos. This
distinction may be important, as it is arguably the case that the neighborhoods numeri-
cally dominated by each of these groups are qualitatively different. First, neighborhoods
with a high proportion of African-Americans traditionally tend to be economically dis-
advantaged neighborhoods that contain a constellation of other measures of concentrated
disadvantage (such as a lower percentage of college graduates, more single parent
households, high unemployment, and high rates of poverty) (e.g. Adelman et al. 2001).
On the other hand, although neighborhoods with a high proportion of Latinos also often
contain residents with relatively low income levels, they generally do not contain all of
these other markers of concentrated disadvantage. For instance, neighborhoods with
higher concentrations of Latinos tend to have lower levels of unemployment and fewer
single parent households than do neighborhoods with higher concentrations of African-
Americans. In Los Angeles in 1990, highly African American neighborhoods (one
standard deviation above the mean) have an unemployment rate of 13.7% and 25.4% of
the families are single-parents. In highly Latino neighborhoods, however, the unem-
ployment rate is 11.4% and only 18.5% of households have a single-parent. The median
household income in African American communities is approximately $3,000 less than in
highly Latino neighborhoods.
Second, the mobility patterns between African American and Latino households differ.
Although minority groups in general are less able to translate their economic attainment or
neighborhood preferences into higher quality neighborhoods, studies consistently show
that Latino households are better equipped to do so than African American residents (Alba
et al. 2000; South et al. 2005). Research also continues to show that African Americans are
still discriminated against in the housing market (Turner et al. 2002; Turner and Ross
2003) and remain more isolated from non-Latino white communities (Charles 2003) than
any other minority group regardless of socioeconomic status (Iceland and Wilkes 2006). It
is likely then that the residential turnover in African American neighborhoods is often
movement between impoverished communities, whereas Latino households have more
stable communities to begin with and are more likely to relocate into less poor areas when
they leave.
Third, the ethnic enclave literature suggests that Latino immigrant neighborhoods might
have a particularly protective effect (Wilson and Portes 1980). Despite general economic
deprivation in such neighborhoods, the presence of dense network ties in these neigh-
borhoods may foster the sort of informal social control that helps reduce crime. That is,
Latino-dominated neighborhoods may foster a particularly strong sense of cohesion as
these ‘‘barrios’’ create an ‘‘institutional completeness’’ (Breton 1964). This would suggest
that residential stability in Latino-dominated neighborhoods would have a different effect
on crime than would stability in African American-dominated neighborhoods, and perhaps
also in white-dominated neighborhoods that would arguably lack such institutional
completeness.
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The above considerations suggest that the relationship between residential instability
and future crime in neighborhoods may differ based on the racial/ethnic composition. In
neighborhoods with a high proportion of African-Americans, residential stability would
likely not have the protective effect hypothesized for it in social disorganization theory. On
the other hand, in neighborhoods with a high proportion of Latinos residential stability
should exhibit its protective effect similar to the posited effect for white-dominated
neighborhoods. We are aware of no studies testing this possibility.
The Effect of Crime on Residential Stability
Much prior research on social disorganization theory has overlooked the possibility that
increases in crime may affect the community social structure. As described above, many
studies employ a cross-sectional test and simply assume that the causal effect of residential
instability on crime explains the relationship. However, there is a small but growing body
of literature suggesting that crime itself may have a feedback effect on the social structural
characteristics of the neighborhood (e.g. Bellair 2000; Sampson et al. 1997). That is, crime
increases because social control is weak, but the increasing crime further decreases social
control by breaking up social networks, decreasing participation in community activities
and inducing residential mobility. Indeed, there is empirical evidence that crime can induce
neighborhood mobility as households relocate in response to violent crime (Morenoff and
Sampson 1997), to victimization (Dugan 1999), or as a response to an increased social
disorder (Skogan 1990). Liska and Bellair (1995) determined that violent crime, robbery in
particular, is associated with residential out-mobility and racial change in cities between
1950 and 1990. If these households leaving the neighborhood are replaced by other
households, residential instability will necessarily increase. On the other hand, Morenoff
and Sampson (1997) focused on the extent to which exiting households are not replaced,
and found a general population loss as the number of homicides in Chicago neighborhoods
increased.
In addition to inducing residential out-mobility, crime can also impact potential
homeowners’ decisions regarding where to move in the first place. For example, Garland
and Stokols (2002) determined that middle-class families are less likely to move into a
neighborhood that is perceived as dangerous or having high rates of crime, regardless of
the actual crime rate. Likewise, community social and physical incivilities such as fighting
and arguing between residents, litter, graffiti, and dilapidated housing are signals to
potential homeowners to avoid such communities because these cues are associated with
potential criminal victimization (Hunter 1978). Neighborhoods with higher crime rates are
also associated with lower housing prices (Schwartz et al. 2003; Tita et al. 2006), which
discourages potential homeowners from purchasing in a community where they may not
profit from their investment.1 These considerations all suggest that residential instability
could decrease if homeowners are unable to sell their property as a result.
Whereas there is reason to expect crime rates to affect mobility into and out of a
neighborhood, it is also possible that this crime will have differential effects based on the
racial/ethnic composition of the neighborhood. The logic builds on the insight of the fear of
1 Another possibility is that a reduction in crime might increase residential instability because rising home
prices may lead to larger profit margins on an investment, causing homeowners to sell their home to
maximize profit. We are aware of no evidence documenting such a process. Nonetheless, to the extent this is
the case, it will diminish the strength of the relationship that we detect between higher crime rates and
subsequent home sales volatility.
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crime literature that has suggested that the racial/ethnic composition of the neighborhood
can affect residents’ perceptions of crime (Sampson and Raudenbush 2004) and fear of
crime (Liska et al. 1982). For instance, studies have shown that both black and white
residents in neighborhoods with more racial/ethnic minorities report higher levels of fear of
crime (Liska et al. 1982). If this fear of crime is compounded by the awareness of
increasing numbers of crime events in the neighborhood, this might synergistically
increase residential mobility out of the neighborhood. We test this possibility here,
although we are aware of no prior tests of this hypothesis.
Measuring Residential Instability
Finally, we briefly consider the issue of how residential stability is measured in empirical
work. Most commonly, residential stability is measured either as the average residential
length of stay in the neighborhood, the proportion of households who moved within the
past 5 years (of the Census), the proportion of residents who own their home, or some
combination of these measures as an index (Garcia et al. 2007). There are two main
dimensions underlying these measures. The first dimension is a direct measure of stability
(either measured as length of time, or the proportion of new residents in the neighborhood).
More new or short-term residents implies that they have had less time to form social
relationships and may therefore be less concerned for the welfare of other residents or the
community. In early work on the relationship of stability to neighborhood and social
problems, Kasarda and Janowitz (1974) found that length of residency significantly and
positively influenced residential attachment. Studies using length of residency have found a
significant negative relationship between average length of residence and crime (Bellair
1997; Hipp 2007a). Similarly, Crutchfield et al. (1982) found a significant positive rela-
tionship between the rate of new residents moving in and violent crime, particularly
homicide, in large U.S. metropolitan areas.
The second main dimension of these measures captures the presence of homeowners. In
part, owners are included in such measures because they tend to live longer in the
neighborhood (as leaving the neighborhood is easier for renters). However, owners as a
group also represent the tendency to express more attachment to the community (Bolan
1997; Oh 2004) and to be more economically invested in the viability of the neighborhood.
Indeed, studies have found that homeowners are less likely to move than renters (Barrett
et al. 1994; Speare et al. 1975), and more likely to know their neighbors and be involved in
social networks than renters (Blum and Kingston 1984; Campbell and Lee 1992). An
increasing level of crime and disorder in the neighborhood likely translates directly into
lower values for one’s home (Tita et al. 2006), suggesting an economic incentive. Indeed
studies have found that neighborhoods with a greater proportion of homeowners have
lower rates of burglary (Ross 1977) and violence (Hipp 2007b; Krivo and Peterson 1996;
Roncek 1981; Smith et al. 2000).
Given these considerations, we suggest that the residential stability of homeowners is
likely of particular theoretical interest. To the extent that renters tend to be relatively
transient, the homeowners of a neighborhood may be a particularly important source of
stability and cohesion in a neighborhood. This would suggest that it is not enough to simply
view the presence of owners, but that it would also be of interest to measure the actual level
of residential stability on the part of homeowners. Although few studies have done so, we
are able to assess the effect of a measure of instability that accounts for the residential
mobility of homeowners, and compare the effect of this measure with a more traditional
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measure of instability based on an index combining the average length of residence and the
proportion homeowners.
Data
Housing, crime, and demographic data for the city of Los Angeles are measured at the
1990 census tract level, our proxy for neighborhood.2 Based upon the 1990 census, Los
Angeles had a population of approximately 3.5 million people. There were 689 census
tracts in Los Angeles in 1990, but we excluded 18 tracts from the analysis because of
missing crime data. We also excluded tracts based on low total population (fewer than 500
residents) or low number of owner-occupied housing units (fewer than 200 units). In those
tracts, small absolute changes in the number of home sales generate large percentage
changes in home sales because of low base rates of residential population. The excluded
tracts tend to cluster in industrial and commercial areas where the number of housing units
is sparse. Our final sample is a panel of 585 census tracts across the years 1992 to 1997.
The average tract population was 4,906. The crime data used in these analyses was
obtained from the Los Angeles Police Department and consists of the total number of Part I
crimes per reporting district (an area approximately equal to a census tract). We appor-
tioned this reporting district data to the appropriate census tracts using a geographic
information systems (GIS) overlay function. The housing sales data were obtained from
DataQuick, Inc., a private vendor of real estate data, and include information on each
single-family residence sold in the City of Los Angeles between 1992 and 1997.
For this study, we focused on the rate of violent crime only, which was computed as the
total homicides, aggravated assaults, and robberies per 100 residents.3 The mean violent
crime rate ranged from 2.29 per 100 in 1992 to 1.58 in 1997 for an average of 2.04 across
the years of the study. This measure was natural log-transformed for the analyses to
achieve a more normal distribution.
The rate of home sales was calculated as the total number of single family owner-
occupied houses sold per year per tract divided by the total number of owner housing units.
We then scaled this per 100 residences in order to put the rate of home sales on the same
scale as the violent crime rate. On average, there were approximately 1,837 housing units
per tract. The rate of home sales averaged 4.0% across the years of the study; approxi-
mately 38 homes per tract sold a year. The mean rate of home sales increased from 3.7% in
1992 to 5.7% in 1997.
Seven time-invariant predictors from the 1990 U.S. Census Summary File 3 were also
included. Because the racial (and ethnic) composition of neighborhoods is one of the most
salient, and sensitive, correlates of high crime rates, we included race/ethnicity measures
for the two largest minority populations in Los Angeles: the proportion of African
American residents and the proportion of Latino residents per tract. On average, tracts were
2 Though there are perhaps many ways to define ‘‘neighborhood,’’ we rely on a conventional method—
tracts—that has been used throughout sociological and criminological research on communities. Like many
studies before us, we are constrained by data availability; in this case, our indicator of neighborhood crime
was only available at the reporting district level, which is essentially analogous to the census tract. We
therefore used census tracts as our proxy for neighborhoods.
3 Although measures of violent crime often include the number of rapes, we chose to limit our measure to
just robbery, aggravated assault, and homicide. Though the occurrence of rape likely induces fear in local
residents, the problematic and inconsistent reporting of rapes and sexual assaults would weaken our ability
to make unbiased conclusions about violent crime and residential instability.
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14% African American, just over 32% Latino, and 44% non-Latino white. Median
household income (in tens of thousands of dollars) and median property value (in hundreds
of thousands of dollars) were also included as indicators of neighborhood affluence; we
included median household income as an independent variable in the model predicting the
violent crime rate, and median housing value as an independent variable in the model
predicting the rate of home sales. In 1990 the average median income across Los Angeles
was $38,525 and the median property value was $255,348. We combined two measures of
residential stability into an index: the percentage of new households in the last 5 years and
the average length of residence. The percent of new households of all households averaged
50.6% across Los Angeles tracts (in 1990). The average length of stay is the average
number of years residents have lived in the neighborhood; in Los Angeles, the mean length
of residency was 10 years. Population density per square mile was included as a control
variable. Our predictor variables are centered on the sample mean for the estimation;
uncentered sample means are shown in Table 1.
To account for the possibility that the racial/ethnic composition of the neighborhood
may moderate the effect of residential instability on crime trajectories, interactions were
created between housing volatility in 1992 and the two race/ethnicity measures. To test
whether the racial/ethnic composition moderates the effect of crime on housing stability
trajectories, interactions were created between violent crime in 1992 and the two race/
ethnicity measures. All four interaction terms were divided by 100 in order to place the
values in a similar metric as the other variables in the model (to minimize estimation
Table 1 Average characteris-




Population density (per square mile) 4.35 2.72
Median household income 38,525 20,448
Median housing value 255,348 123,978
Percent Black 14.0 22.7
Percent Latino 32.4 25.6
Percent white 44.3 33.2
Length of residency (in years) 10 2.74
Percent owner-occupied 48.8 24.4
Percent new residents (in last 5 years) 50.6 11.0
Rate of home sales (per 100) 1992 3.73 1.96
Rate of home sales (per 100) 1993 3.77 2.02
Rate of home sales (per 100) 1994 4.63 2.24
Rate of home sales (per 100) 1995 4.63 2.52
Rate of home sales (per 100) 1996 5.19 2.80
Rate of home sales (per 100) 1997 5.66 2.98
Violent crime rate (per 100) 1992 (logged) 2.29 1.83
Violent crime rate (per 100) 1993 (logged) 2.19 1.73
Violent crime rate (per 100) 1994 (logged) 1.97 1.61
Violent crime rate (per 100) 1995 (logged) 1.90 1.55
Violent crime rate (per 100) 1996 (logged) 1.74 1.44
Violent crime rate (per 100) 1997 (logged) 1.58 1.31
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problems). In ancillary models, we computed interactions of our residential stability index
and these two race/ethnicity measures.
Method
We used dual latent trajectory analysis to model patterns of change in the violent crime rate
and housing sales over time. Latent trajectory models, or growth curve models, are not
widely employed in criminological research, but have been successfully applied in psy-
chological studies on individual behaviors such as cigarette smoking (Windle and Windle
2001) changes in personality disorders over time (Lenzenweger and Willett 2007) and
obesity (Henderson 2007). These models allow for estimation of differences between
individual rates of change and therefore are appropriate when measuring human behavior,
which undeniably varies between subjects. Traditional regression analysis cannot account
for this between subject variation and treats the slope and intercept as equal for all cases. It
is unlikely that all neighborhoods throughout Los Angeles experience change at the same
rate; some communities sold more houses at an increasing rate, while others remained
stable, and in undesirable areas, at a decreasing rate. It makes sense, therefore, to apply this
technique to larger units of analysis such as neighborhoods, and indeed other work has
done so looking at homicide trajectories in census tracts (Kubrin and Herting 2003) or the
clustering of psychological characteristics in groups (Nagin 1999).
In addition, LTMs can account for simultaneous relationships between variables that
ordinary regression analysis cannot account for. Traditionally, longitudinal analysis has
relied on either a raw change or a residual change score to estimate between year changes,
implicitly assuming that the current crime rate (for example) is dependent on the rate of
crime in previous years. Latent trajectory models, however, estimate the underlying tra-
jectory using information from the full temporal sequence, not simply the difference
between two time points. This allows for an overall pattern of change across time while
accounting for intercommunity differences.
Our models utilize the six waves of data from 1992 to 1997.4 A diagram of our
conditional model without interaction terms is shown in Fig. 1, where alpha is the latent
intercept of the rate of violent crime and beta is the latent slope of the violent crime rate;
alphah and betah are the latent intercept and slope for the rate of housing sales. Violent 92
through violent 97 are the natural logged observed rate of violent crime, and sales 92
through sales 97 are the rate of residential home sales (per 100 units). We simplify the
diagram by representing our seven time-invariant predictors in a single box. Error1 and
errorh1 through error7 and errorh7 represent the disturbance (or variability) around our
observed measures; a_error, ah_error, b_error, and bh_error represent the disturbance
around our latent measures. Covaah and covbbh represent the covariance between the
intercepts (alpha and alphah) of crime and housing, and the covariance between the slope
(beta and betah) of crime and housing.
Our estimation adopted the following steps. First, we estimated ‘‘unconditional’’ models
without covariates for the violent crime rate and home sales in order to determine the
functional form of these trajectories over time. Second, we estimated our full model in
which the predictors described above (excluding the residential stability index) are allowed
to predict both the latent intercepts and latent slopes of housing volatility and violent crime
4 Multicollinearity among the other exogenous variables was not an issue; all VIF scores were less than 10,
which is generally considered the maximum acceptable level of multicollinearity (Kennedy 1998).
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simultaneously. This same model also allows us to test our key hypotheses: whether the
latent intercept of violent crime affects the trajectory of housing volatility over this time
period, and whether the latent intercept of housing volatility affects the violent crime
trajectory over the period. Third, we estimated a model that tested whether the race/ethnicity
of the neighborhood moderated these relationships between housing volatility and violent
crime by including the interaction variables described above. Fourth, we estimated similar
models substituting an index of residential stability for our housing volatility measure to
compare the effect of general residential stability to that specifically of homeowners. In
these single LTMs (of crime), the random intercept of home sales volatility was replaced















































































Fig. 1 Conditional model of the relationship between the violent crime rate and the rate of home sales
controlling for neighborhood characteristics, 1992–1997
360 J Quant Criminol (2010) 26:351–370
123
was replaced with the change in the index of residential stability from 1990 to 2000. All
models were estimated using maximum likelihood estimation in AMOS 5.0.
Results
Unconditional Model
Unconditional LTMs for the violent crime rate and residential home sales were estimated
to examine the overall trajectory and test for neighborhood variability over time. We
estimated our models with linear, unstructured (freed-loading), and quadratic trajectories.
In the linear model, the model implied rate of change is consistent across the years of the
study, whereas in the freed-loading model the impact of time is allowed to vary. We
determined that the pattern of change in the crime rate trajectory over time is best fit
nonlinearly in the unstructured model.5 That is, the rate of change across time is not
constant: the violent crime rate decreases more substantially in the first years of the study
than in the latter. The following results then are based on the freed-loading model.
The mean value of the violent crime rate at the starting point (the intercept) was 0.195
and the average between-wave change in slope is -0.054 (or a reduction of approximately
5.4% per year). The negative coefficient on the slope implies that the mean violent crime
rate is decreasing through 1997. Our conditional models will therefore compare the relative
change in crime among tracts: those with positive slopes may in fact experience a decrease
in crime, however, this will be a smaller decrease than that of other neighborhoods. The
variance for both the intercept and slope of the violent crime trajectory were significant,
indicating neighborhood variability in both the initial rate of violent crime in 1992 and the
rate of change in violent crime over time.
Turning to the home sales LTM, we concluded that a freed-loading model was also the
best representation of the residential home sales trajectory over the time period. Like the
violent crime LTM, the chi-square for the unconditional sales model is significant; alter-
native summary fit indices, however, suggest that the model fits the data well, though it is
not as good a fit as the violent crime LTM.6 The results show that the average rate of home
sales in 1992 was 3.76 per 100 homes, and the average annual increase in the rate of sales
5 Whereas the linear model codes time in an equally increasing value for each year, the unstructured model
constrains the first time point to a value of zero and the last time point to a value of one, and then freely
estimates the nonparametric functional form for the intervening time points. For the linear violent crime
LTM the chi-square test of overall fit yielded v2 = 81.8, df = 16, and p \ .001, whereas the freed-loading
model had a v2 = 51.4, df = 12, and p \ .001. A nested test shows that the freed-loading model fits
significantly better (v2 = 30.4, df = 4, p \ .001). The approximate fit measures suggest that this freed-
loading model fits quite well with an IFI = .995 (compared to .991 for the linear model). Given that values
greater than .90 are considered a good fit, this is an excellent fit. We also used the root-mean-square error of
approximation index of fit (RMSEA), which builds on the non-central v2 distribution. Values closest to 0
indicate a good fit. The RMSEA values indicate that the unstructured model (RMSEA = .075 (CI = .055
.097)), fit better than the linear model .084 (CI = .066 .102). We also tested a quadratic trajectory model and
found it to fit similarly to the unstructured model. The estimated value of the quadratic latent term, however,
was not significantly different than 0, therefore, we used the unstructured model.
6 The linear home sales model had a v2 = 181.1, df = 16, p \ .001, whereas the freed-loading model had a
v2 = 111.1, df = 12, p \ .001. Again, the nested test shows the freed-loading model had a better fit
(v2 = 70.0, df = 4, p \ .001). The IFI of .971 (compared to .95 for the linear model) also suggests a very
good fit. The RMSEA = .119 (CI = .99 .139) also shows a better fit than the linear model (RMSEA = .133
(CI .116 .151). The quadratic trajectory model did not fit as well as the unstructured model (IFI = .957, and
RMSEA = .143 (CI = .123 .164).
J Quant Criminol (2010) 26:351–370 361
123
is approximately 1.9 sales per 100 homes. The variances of the intercept and slope were
significant, confirming between neighborhood variability in the starting rate of home sales
and the trajectory of sales.
Conditional Models
We next test our key hypotheses by combining the previous two models into a dual LTM
and simultaneously testing whether the home sales intercept significantly predicts the
violent crime slope, and whether the violent crime intercept significantly predicts the home
sales slope. The results in Table 2 show clearly that whereas there is no evidence that home
sales volatility increases the subsequent trajectory of violent crime—in fact, the coefficient
is somewhat negative, though not significant—there is strong evidence that higher rates of
violent crime result in a steeper increase in home sales volatility over the following years
(b = 5.628, p \ .001). That is, more violent neighborhoods tend to have increased resi-
dential turnover over time, as a one percent increase in the violent crime rate results in a
1.5 percent increase in the home sales trajectory for an average tract.7 These findings are
inconsistent with the hypothesis in social disorganization theory that residential instability
leads to more violent crime.
Consistent with prior research, we find that the racial and ethnic composition of a
neighborhood is associated with local violent crime rates. The proportions of African
Americans and Latinos are positively and significantly related to the intercept of the violent
crime rate. Controlling for all other covariates, neighborhoods with larger proportions of
African American (b = 0.0029, p \ .001) and Latino (b = 0.0011, p \ .001) residents
have higher initial violent crime rates in 1992. There is no evidence, however, that these
Table 2 Regression results for conditional latent trajectory model for the relationship between the rate of









Violent crime intercept – – – 5.62848***
(0.83183)
Home sales intercept – -0.00234
(0.00145)
– –

































* Significant at a\ .05, ** significant at a\ .01, *** significant at a\ .001; standard errors in parentheses
7 This is calculated as follows: given the logarithmic form for the violent crime rate, a .01 change in this
measure represents a 1 percent increase in violent crime. This .01 increase results in a .056 increase in the
number of home sales per 100 homes. Given that the average neighborhood had a home sales rate of 3.73 in
1992, this translates into a 1.5% increase (.056/3.73 = .015).
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neighborhoods experience increasing violent crime trajectories over this period. In fact,
neighborhoods with a greater proportion African Americans actually experience a slight
decreasing rate of violent crime over the subsequent years (b = -0.00125, p \ .001). That
is, a one percentage point increase in African American residents is related to 0.10%
decrease in the trajectory of violent crime controlling for all other covariates. The size of the
Latino population is not significantly associated with the change in the violent crime rate
over time. In sum, neighborhoods with more racial/ethnic minorities have higher rates of
violent crime in 1992, but no evidence of increasing rates of violent crime beyond that point.
The racial and ethnic makeup of communities is also associated with residential home
sales. Areas with more minority residents have lower rates of housing sales; both the
proportion of African Americans (b = -0.0222, p \ .001) and Latinos (b = -0.0382,
p \ .001) in a neighborhood are significantly and negatively related to the initial rate of
home sales in 1992. This implies that such neighborhoods have lower rates of housing
turnover among owners. Furthermore, we see that these neighborhoods with more minority
residents also experience decreasing sales over the subsequent years, as neighborhoods
with larger percentages of African Americans (b = -0.0287, p \ .001) and Latinos
(b = -0.0216, p \ .001) experience relatively fewer home sales than neighborhoods with
more white residents. A one percentage point increase in the proportion African American
or Latino residents is related to a nearly 0.5% decrease in the slope of home sales for an
average tract. These findings imply that the size of the Latino population in a neighborhood
has no impact on the trajectory of violent crime over time, but reduces the magnitude of the
Table 3 Regression results for full conditional model (including interaction effects) of the relationship









Violent crime intercept – – – 5.62590***
(0.83181)
Home sales intercept – -0.00227
(0.00145)
– –
African American * Violent crime – – – 3.7529
(2.8424)
Latino * Violent crime – – – -0.63161
(2.2409)
African American * Home sales – 0.00905
(0.00547)
– –
Latino * Home sales – 0.01186***
(0.00355)
– –

































* Significant at a\ .05, ** significant at a\ .01, *** significant at a\ .001; standard errors in parentheses
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rate of home sales, whereas the size of the African American population reduces both the
rate of home sales over time and the rate of violent crime.
We next tested whether the racial/ethnic composition of the neighborhood moderated
the potentially reciprocal relationship between crime and residential instability. We see no
evidence that the effect of violent crime on subsequent home sales is moderated by the
racial/ethnic composition of the neighborhood, as the interactions between violent crime
and the two minority groups do not have a significant effect on the trajectory of home sales
volatility over the subsequent years, as seen in Table 3. Nonetheless, we highlight that
violent crime remains a robust predictor of the housing sales volatility trajectory, and at
approximately the same magnitude as the conditional model without the interaction effects,
suggesting that violent crime induces mobility in all types of neighborhoods. On the other
hand, we do see that the effect of home sales volatility on violent crime trajectories is
moderated by the proportion Latino in the neighborhood. In neighborhoods with a larger
proportion of Latino residents, increasing rates of home sales have the expected positive
effect on the trajectory of violent crime over the subsequent years (b = 0.0119, p \ .001).
This illustrates that the relationship between the rate of home sales and the rate of violent
crime varies as function of the size of the Latino population.
To provide a sense of the magnitude of the moderating relationship, Fig. 2 plots dif-
ferent trajectories of violent crime for various hypothetical neighborhoods with differing
rates of home sales volatility and different size populations of Latinos. In this Figure,
‘High’ and ‘Low’ refer to one standard deviation above the mean and one standard
deviation below the mean, respectively. We see that residential stability influences the
direction of the violent crime trajectory: in highly Latino neighborhoods with a high rate of
home sales (i.e. highly unstable), the trajectory of violent crime is positive. However, in
highly Latino neighborhoods with a low rate of home sales (i.e. highly stable), the tra-




















High home sales & low % Latino High rate of home sales High % Latino & high rate of home sales
Low % Latino Mean High % Latino
Low % Latino & low rate of home sales Low rate of home sales Low home sales & high % Latino
Fig. 2 Trajectory of the rate of violent crime 1992–1997 controlling for the percent Latino residents and the
rate of home sales
364 J Quant Criminol (2010) 26:351–370
123
Testing a Different Measure of Residential Stability
Up to this point we have seen a clear pattern of results: (1) violent crime appears to have a
strong effect on the subsequent rate of residential instability in a neighborhood as measured
by home sales volatility; (2) residential instability (measured by home sales volatility)
appears to have little effect on subsequent trajectories of violent crime rates in neigh-
borhoods; and (3) residential instability does appear to cause more subsequent violent
crime in neighborhoods with a greater proportion of Latino residents. Nonetheless, we are
employing a somewhat unorthodox measure of residential instability by only focusing on
the mobility of homeowners. For our next set of analyses, we employ a more traditional
measure of stability: our factor score combining the percent of new residents who moved to
the tract within 5 years and the average length of residence in the tract in 1990. Higher
values of the stability index indicate greater stability and low values indicate residential
instability. We substituted the factor variable for the latent intercept of home sales vola-
tility in the previous models and the difference between this index in 1990 and 2000 as an
indicator of the change in residential stability over time. This change indicator is substi-
tuted for the latent trajectory of home sales volatility in the previous models; although this
Table 4 Regression results for full conditional model (including interaction effects) of the relationship
between the rate of violent crime and change in the residential stability index, N = 585
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* Significant at a\ .05, ** significant at a\ .01, *** significant at a\ .001; standard errors in parentheses
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is a less desirable measure given that it does not account for yearly changes, it does allow
us to assess the robustness of our prior results.
The results using this alternative measure of residential stability generally mirror those
presented above with one major exception, as shown in Table 4. By including renters in
our residential stability index we find that residential stability has a significant negative
impact on the violent crime trajectory, a relationship that was non-significant in our pre-
vious models. This is evidence of a reciprocal relationship between change in violent crime
and change in residential stability: increases in residential instability are associated with
increases in the trajectory of violent crime, but those increases in violence are also related
to increased residential instability over time. Nonetheless, we point out that based on
standardized coefficients, the effect of violent crime on the change in residential stability
(-0.3028) is twice the size of the effect of residential stability on the change in violent
crime (-0.1436). Given that the instability of homeowners specifically had no effect on
violent crime in our original models, this implies a differential relationship between res-
idential stability and change in violence depending on whether or not the definition of
residential (in)stability includes renters or focuses solely on homeowners. Such a possi-
bility has not been previously raised in the literature.
As in the original models, when we take into account the racial/ethnic composition of
the neighborhood in which residential stability occurs in the second model in Table 4, we
again see that the effect of residential stability on violent crime trajectories is stronger in
neighborhoods with more Latino residents. Residentially stable neighborhoods with more
Latinos experience a negative trajectory of violent crime in subsequent years (b =
-0.00047, p \ .001). In addition, we see that by accounting for renters in our stability
index, stable neighborhoods with more African Americans actually result in steeper
increases in the violent crime trajectory in subsequent years (b = 0.00017, p \ .05); a
relationship that was in the same direction but non-significant in the models focusing
exclusively on homeowners. This may be a function of the lower financial resources
associated with renters as opposed to homeowners, who may be trapped in communities
despite increases in violent crime because they are unable to find adequate affordable
housing elsewhere. Indeed, a report on housing markets in California between 1990 and
1997 concluded that the supply of housing for lower income renters is extremely limited,
particularly in metropolitan areas such as Los Angeles (Smith-Heimer 1999).
As further verification of the potential unique roles homeowners and renters play when
measuring instability, additional models using a stability factor score including the percent
homeowners replicated the pattern of findings from the latent trajectory models initially
discussed (results not shown). That is, we created a stability index comprised of the
average length of stay, the percent of residents in the same home for the past 5 years, and
the percent homeowners. Models with this measure found a significant and negative effect
of changes in violent crime on changes in residential stability, but no such effect of
increased stability on changes in violent crime over time. This measure showed similar
effects to our main models when accounting for the racial and ethnic composition of
neighborhoods. This further substantiates the need to parse out renter and homeowner
mobility, particularly in minority communities.
Discussion
This study has shed light on three important questions: (1) what is the relationship between
the rate of violent crime and residential stability when accounting for the simultaneous
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reciprocal relationship; (2) are the effects of homeowner stability and neighborhood sta-
bility in general equivocal; and (3) how does the racial/ethnic composition of the com-
munity impact the violent crime—stability relationship. The majority of prior studies
examining crime and residential instability only explore one side of the equation, but by
using a dual latent trajectory model we were able to account for the reciprocal relationship
between longitudinal changes in the rate of violent crime and residential instability at the
same time. Additionally, we used a novel measure of instability—the rate of residential
home sales—in order to specifically test the importance of homeowners in residential
stability. Our findings suggest that the relationship between violent crime and home sales
volatility may operate in only one direction when focusing specifically on homeowners:
whereas our results failed to find a significant impact of homeowner turnover on the rate of
violent crime as expected under a social disorganization framework, we did find that
neighborhoods with more violent crime experienced increasing residential home sales over
time. When using an alternative measure of residential stability that incorporates renters,
we find some evidence of a reciprocal effect of violent crime on residential stability and
residential instability on violence. Nonetheless, we still found that the effect of crime on
the change in residential instability appeared almost twice as strong as the reverse effect.
The most important conclusion from our study is the robust finding that higher rates of
violent crime in neighborhoods lead to increasing rates of residential instability. This
finding was detected for both our housing volatility measure and our index of residential
stability, and regardless of the racial/ethnic composition of the neighborhood. These
findings are consistent with previous research showing that increasing crime rates can
negatively affect the rate of homeownership (White 2001), can lead to residential out-
mobility (Morenoff and Sampson 1997), and that criminal victimization induces mobility
(Dugan 1999). Our results support the idea that higher rates of violent crime increase
residential turnover, but also indicate that instability is enduring over time. We found that a
one percent increase in the violent crime rate was associated with a 1.5% increase in the
trajectory of homes sold in an average tract. This likely represents the desire of residents to
move away from areas with high rates of violent crime to safer areas.
A second important implication of our findings is that it may be important for scholars
to consider the form of instability. Although violent crime increased subsequent levels of
residential instability—regardless how we measured it—we generally found weaker effects
of instability on changes in violent crime over time. There was no evidence that home-
owner turnover affected subsequent levels of violent crime. Likewise, an instability index
including a measure of the percent homeowners had no effect on changes in violent crime.
Only an index focused entirely on the housing turnover of all residents showed a significant
effect on the change in violent crime over time. It is possible that this represents poorer
residents trapped by limited economic resources to relocate in response to crime increases.
It is also possible that increased housing volatility in part represents the positive effects of
gentrification through rehabilitated housing stock and a deconcentration of poverty
(Atkinson 2004). Neighborhoods undergoing gentrification will experience high residential
instability that may not necessarily lead to higher rates of crime. Research has already
shown that homeowners have positive effects on the community (e.g. Campbell and Lee
1992; Oh 2004) and are a protective factor against crime (e.g. Hipp 2007b), but our results
suggest that the residential stability of renters may nonetheless be important to take into
account. These two effects—instability and homeownership—may have contradictory
impacts on crime over time and the distinction is important to explicate.
Although we found no evidence that residential instability leads to more violent crime
over time for neighborhoods in the housing volatility model in general, we did find that this
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effect was present in neighborhoods with high proportions of Latinos. Neighborhoods with
a large Latino population and higher residential instability experienced steeper violent
crime trajectories for both measures of residential instability. In contrast, highly Latino
neighborhoods with low instability rates experienced a decreasing trajectory of violent
crime. This suggests that stable Latino barrios (ethnic enclaves) may be a protective factor
from violent crime. Whether this finding will be replicated in studies of other metro areas is
an important research agenda for future work.
The fact that residential stability did not reduce violent crime trajectories in mostly
African American neighborhoods was also notable. It is worth highlighting that this was
the case regardless of how we measured residential instability. Furthermore, we found that
the residential stability index was actually associated with increasing rates of violent crime
in African American neighborhoods. The fact that this measure of stability that takes into
account the presence of renters actually resulted in a steeper increase in violent crime may
represent the limited mobility of poorer renters in such neighborhoods who are unable to
find alternative affordable housing in safer areas. This highlights not only the importance
of taking into account the racial/ethnic composition of the neighborhood in which such
residential stability occurs, but also the form of this residential stability.
While this study has provided key insights into the complex relationship between violent
crime, residential turnover, and race/ethnicity, some limitations should be acknowledged.
First, we studied a relatively short time period during which Los Angeles, like the rest of the
country, was experiencing a housing boom and a general decrease in violent crime. It would
be a logical extension of this research to expand the years under study to account for the
recent slowdown in the housing market (which could impact the ability of residents to sell
their homes). Similarly, it may be advantageous to compare Los Angeles to another city. Of
course, current formulations of social disorganization theory do not specify that the rela-
tionship between residential instability and crime rates will be moderated by the overall
trajectory of crime in the larger city. This might suggest a particular scope condition for the
social disorganization model: the theory only applies during periods in which overall crime
is constant or increasing. To our knowledge, such a scope condition has never been put
forward for the social disorganization theory, nor have theoretical reasons been given for
why we should expect such a limitation on what is postulated as a more general theory.
Nonetheless, we leave it to future research to test for such possible macro level effects on the
relationship between crime and residential instability. Second, we cannot account for
changes in the population characteristics over time. Because of data constraints we must
rely on census data as a measure of neighborhood demographics, but it is likely that
population changes occurred in Los Angeles during this time. Intercensal information on the
racial/ethnic composition of tracts would allow us to track how changes in the racial/ethnic
composition may be impacting the trajectories.
Despite these limitations, this study contributes to our knowledge of an important area
of criminological research. Controlling for simultaneous relationships in neighborhoods is
essential in order to fully understand the complex interactions between violent crime,
residential stability, and racial/ethnic composition. Until we can fully understand how
these three elements operate together to perpetuate crime, we will be unable to successfully
implement policies or programs to either reduce crime or increase residential stability.
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